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MUTUALITY OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN MULTI-
STATE LITIGATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
When the laws and interests of two or more jurisdictions conflict, courts
often must adjust these interests to preserve comity between the jurisdic-
tions.1 Conflict of laws rules preserve comity in such situations by deter-
mining which jurisdiction's interest shall prevail. 2 Courts must confront a
significant conflict of laws problem when deciding what effect a judgment
of one jurisdiction will have on subsequent litigation in another jurisdic-
tion. Although all jurisdictions recognize judgments of sister jurisdictions,
3
some attach the precondition that both parties in the subsequent litigation
be bound by the prior judgment.4 Because many jurisdictions do not re-
quire this precondition of "mutuality",' a court considering the collateral
estoppel effect of a foreign judgment faces the troubling conflicts question
of whether to apply its own mutuality requirement or to defer to the re-
quirement of the rendering jurisdiction.
Under the concept of collateral estoppel,' a valid and final judgment is
conclusive ii* any subsequent litigation between the parties as to all essen-
tial issues of fact actually litigated in a prior proceeding.7 Collateral estop-
Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REv. 330, 330 (1944).
2 Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171
[hereinafter cited as Currie, Conflict of Laws]. See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLiCr OF
LAWS (1962) [hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEIG]; H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLEs, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as GOODRICH & SCOLES].
Recognition of the judgments of a sister jurisdiction is required by the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; see text accompanying notes 32-
34 infra.
See text accompanying notes 16-18 infra.
Many jurisdictions abandoning the requirement of mutuality have replaced mutuality
with a "full and fair opportunity" test. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 infra.
a Courts and commentators use the term "issue preclusion" synonymously with "col-
lateral estoppel" to identify the doctrine that precludes relitigation of essential issues of
fact decided in a prior proceeding. See, e.g., Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30,
31 (8th Cir. 1964); Vestal, Preclusion / Res Judicata Variables : Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27,
28 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Vestal, Preclusion]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
7 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); see RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68 (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). See
generally Polasky, Collateral Estoppel - Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REv. 217 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Polasky].
Collateral estoppel first received application in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351
(1876). In Cromwell, the plaintiff first brought an action to recover on interest coupons due
on bonds issued by the defendant. The district court rendered judgment for the defendant,
holding that issuance of the bonds was fraudulently induced. Id. at 359. Upon maturity of
the bonds, the plaintiff sued to recover the principal. The Supreme Court rejected the defen-
dant's contention that the prior judgment operated to estop the plaintiff. The Court noted
that the question whether the plaintiff paid value for the bonds did not come up in the prior
action and held that where a second suit is brought upon a different cause of action, the prior
judgment operates as an estoppel only to issues "actually litigated and determined in the
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pel precludes relitigation of those essential issues regardless of whether the
prior judgment was based upon the same cause of action as the second
suit.' Collateral estoppel is distinguishable from res judicatal in that with
collateral estoppel, the issues and facts actually litigated, rather than the
prior judgment, stand as a barrier to relitigation. 10 Nevertheless, both res
judicata and collateral estoppel are rules of justice and fairness,11 designed
to add certainty and stability to the judicial system by generating public
respect for the courts and by conserving judicial time and resources."2 In
addition, by reducing litigation expenses, harassing lawsuits, and oppor-
tunities for conflicting judicial declarations, res judicata and collateral
estoppel serve private.interests .
3
original action, not what might have been litigated and determined." Id. at 352-53; see 1B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441 (1974); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); see Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L. REv. 521 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Collateral Estoppen]. See generally Developments in the Law - Res Judicata, 65
HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952).
Res judicata, or "claim preclusion", prevents the same parties or their privies from
relitigating the same cause of action and thus precludes all issues previously decided. In
addition, res judicata normally bars every matter that might have been raised in the first suit.
See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946); Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); RESTATEMENT OF JUDorES § 45 (1942); Vestal, Preclusion,
supra note 6; Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 52. Res judicata reflects the refusal of
courts to tolerate needless litigation. The doctrine serves to accomplish this public policy by
insuring that when one appears in court, fully litigates the contested issue and the court
decides the issue against him, he should not renew the litigation in another court. Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1947); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946).
o See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Stevenson v. International
Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 109-10 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351 (1876); Clark v. Clark, 80 Nev. 52, 389 P.2d 69 (1964); Collateral Estoppel, supra
note 8, at 521.
1 Croudson v. Leonard, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 434, 437 (1808); Southwest Airlines Co. v.
Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 117 (1977); Hinchey
v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 294, 165 N.E.2d 156, 159, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134 (1959).
12 See Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLrM. L. REV.
1457, 1457 n.2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Semmel]; Vestal, Res Judicata / Preclusion by
Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1723, 1723 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Vestal, Federal Courts]; Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judg-
ment, The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1098, 1098-99 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Privity Rule].
Application of res judicata principles preserves the finality of court resolutions. Without
such finality, court determinations would be relegfted to the status of advisory opinions,
destroying much of the law's utility as a stabilizing social influence. See Vestal, Preclusion!
Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1966); Vestal, Ration-
ale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 31-34 (1964); Privity Rule, supra, at 1099. In addi-
tion, to the extent that application of res judicata prevents repetitive litigation, savings in
judicial time and resources result. See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of
Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301, 308 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Moore & Currier]; Vestal,
Federal Courts, supra, at 1723; von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929);
Privity Rule, supra, at 1099.
1, Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1977);
Vestal, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 1723; Privity Rule, supra note 12, at 1098-99.
Conclusive determinations in law suits provide a basis for planning future conduct. See G.
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Application of collateral estoppel principles generally requires an ident-
ity of issues and a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues in the
prior action. 4 Moreover, the determination of the issues must have been
essential to the prior judgment.'5 Many jurisdictions also require satisfac-
tion of the mutuality requirement before operation of collateral estoppel
principles." Requiring mutuality prior to invoking collateral estoppel prin-
ciples demands that one who asserts a previously contested issue as conclu-
sive of an issue raised in subsequent litigation must have been a party or
his privy in the prior suit.'" Thus, mutuality prevents a litigant who is not
bound by a prior judgment from employing that judgment to determine
an issue in a second action." Precluding the use of a prior judgment in
these situations rests on the equitable concept that when a right or remedy
is unavailable to one party, the law should deny the corresponding right
or remedy to his adversary." In recent years, however, widespread dissatis-
BowER, THE DoCTrINE oF REs JUDIcATA 4 (1924); Privity Rule, supra note 12, at 1098-99. In
addition, conclusive determinations protect a litigant from harassment by repeated litigation
of the same claim by a contentious adversary. Vestal, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 1723;
Privity Rule, supra note 12, at 1099.
" See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad
Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); 1B MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.433 (1974); cf. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451
(1922) (exclusive leases not violative of the Sherman Act were violative of the Clayton Act
because the two causes of action involved different issues).
'1 James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1971); see
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). If the judgment could have been based upon
one of several alternative issues and does not rely on any one of them expressly, then the
litigation of the issues will not operate as an estoppel in subsequent litigation. See 1B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[5] (1974).
" See, e.g., Cowan v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 22 Ill. App. 3d 883, 890, 318 N.E.2d 315,
321 (App. Ct. 1974); Wright v. Holt, 18 N.C.App. 661, 662, 197 S.E.2d 811, 812 (Ct.App.),
cert. denied, 283 N.C. 759, 198 S.E.2d 729 (1973); Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282, 284-
85 (N.D. 1972); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 113-14, 254 N.E.2d 10,
15 (1969). See generally Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. Rv. 25, 38-
46 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Tempest]. Many of these jurisdictions recognize
several exceptions to the requirement of mutuality. For example, a judgment exonerating a
party who is primarily liable may preclude relitigation of the liability issue against a party
who is secondarily or derivatively liable. See Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894,
897 (4th Cir. 1965); 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTcE 0.411, 0.412 (1974); Semmel, supra note
12, at 1462-63; Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 523.
11 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d
894, 896 (4th Cir 1965). See generally Moore & Currier, supra note 12; Semmel, supra note
12, at 1459. Privity is a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Privity exists when "the relationship be-
tween one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include that other within
the res adjudicata." Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); see Vestal, Preclusion, supra note 6, at 45. See
generally Privity Rule, supra note 12, at 1100-02.
" See Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1965).
" See id.; Semmel, supra note 12, at 1461. Reciprocity of preclusion is not the sole factor
warranting mutuality requirements. The inherently personal nature of in personam judg-
ments and the fairness of insuring that one has an opportunity to face his adversaries directly
also justify mutuality. Moore & Currier, supra note 12, at 308-10; Collateral Estoppel, supra
1978]
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faction among state and federal courts with the mutuality test has led
several courts to abandon the requirement."0 These courts premise their
rejection of mutuality upon the need to improve judicial efficiency by
reducing litigation of previously resolved issues."1 Arguably, retention of
mutuality strains judicial resources by permitting an individual to reliti-
gate an issue as many times as he has adversaries.Y Most courts that reject
mutuality thus have adopted the general principle that when a party re-
ceives a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issues in a prior action,
he subsequently may not relitigate those issues decided against him, re-
gardless of the identity of his adversary.Y In a subsequent action, the trial
note 8, at 527. Additional justifications of the mutuality requirement include the fallibility
of the jury system, Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir.
1943), the danger of a sympathetic plaintiff, Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie,
Mutuality], compromise verdicts, Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346
F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), incompetent counsel in the
prior suit, Graves v. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 901 (4th Cir. 1965), and the
discovery of new evidence, United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (D.
Nev. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). See Collateral Estoppel, supra note 12, at 1461-66; Note,
Collateral Estoppel in Multistate Litigation, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 1590, 1596-97 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Multistate Litigation].
" See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942);
B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). See
generally Currie, Tempest, supra note 16, at 38-46. Moreover, the increasing recognition of
exceptions to the requirement may evidence dissatisfaction among courts that still require
mutuality. See note 16 supra.
2, See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive analysis of the economic
consequences of adhering to the requirement of mutuality in patent cases. The Court con-
cluded that the interests of judicial effeciency warranted abandonment of the mutuality
requirement. Id. at 334-48.
Opponents of the mutuality requirement point out that the concept of mutuality is
ancient in origin and that there is no satisfactory explanation for continued adherence other
than some unfounded principle of "natural fairness". 35 YALE L.J. 607, 608 (1926). In addi-
tion, critics attack the mutuality requirement as "destitute of any semblance of reason and
as 'a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming table to the
bench'...." Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934
(1964), quoting, 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827); see Blonder-
Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1971).
" See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 528.
2 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329
(1971); Brown v. DeLayo, 498 F.2d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 1974); Berner v. British Common-
wealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir. 1965).
Courts that have adopted the "full and fair opportunity" test justify the test by the
orderliness and time savings in judicial administration that result from its application. Bru-
szewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); see
Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334-48 (1971).
Proponents of mutuality recognize the public advantage in the reduction of litigation
that would accompany an abolition of the requirement. The proponents argue, however, that
the "public advantage" also would be served "if there were no litigation at all" and state that
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judge determines whether a party received a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the contested issues in the prior suit.2 ' As a result of this trend
toward abandonment of the mutuality requirement, the application of
mutuality by different jurisdictions may vary greatly.2
Because mutuality is not yet a "dead letter"2 in every jurisdiction, 2 a
court considering the collateral estoppel effect of an issue litigated in an-
other state must determine which state's mutuality requirement applies.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the law of the
state rendering the judgment determines the preclusionary effect of a valid
foreign judgment,7 subject to constitutional limitations.29 Although the
Restatement reflects the weight of authority,M several jurisdictions do not
defer to the mutuality requirement of the rendering jurisdiction.' The
inconsistent practices of different jurisdictions thus create a dilemma for
the multi-state litigant who faces conflicting mutuality requirements but
"the question is, at what point does the public interest in reducing litigation yield to the
interest in fair procedure." Currie, Mutuality, supra note 19, at 288; see Polasky, supra note
7, at 219. In Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950), the plaintiff argued,
in effect, that failure to require mutuality made the application of collateral estoppel asym-
metrical. Id. at 421. The Bruszewski court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that "the
achievement of substantial justice rather than symmetry is the measure of the fairness of the
rules of res judicata." Id.; see Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir.
1977).
2, See Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977); Currie,
Mutuality, supra note 19, at 296; Polasky, supra note 7, at 219; Collateral Estoppel, supra
note 8, at 544-45. In "mass tort" situations, judicial implementation of the "full and fair
opportunity" test is desirable. The severe consequences of allowing subsequent plaintiffs to
assert a prior judgment as collateral estoppel in later suits make the need to assess carefully
whether a defendant received a full and fair opportunity especially pressing. See Currie,
Mutuality, supra note 19, at 285-88; 57 HARv. L. REv. 98, 105 (1943); note 57 infra.
See Currie, Tempest, supra note 16, at 38-46.
21 See B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596
(1967)(the doctrine of mutuality is a "dead letter" in the state of New York).
See text accompanying notes 16 & 20 supra.
m Section 94 of the Restatement states: "What persons are bound by a valid judgment
is determined, subject to constitutional limitations, by the local law of the State where the
judgment was rendered," while §95 states: "What issues are determined by a valid judgment
is determined, subject to constitutional limitations, by the local law of the State where the
judgment was rendered." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUcr OF LAws §§94, 95 (1971).
21 When state privity rules conflict with the due process requirements of the Constitu-
tion, the privity rules are void and the judgment does not affect persons covered by the rule
either in a sister state or in the state of rendition. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNFUmT OF LAws
§ 94, Comment b (1971).
3 See EHRENWzEEO, supra note 2, at § 66; GOODIUCH & SCOLEs, supra note 2, at § 217;
see, e.g., Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940).
11 See, e.g., Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc.2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1966). See
also Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 381, 381-82
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Carrington]; Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1601. The
jurisdictions employing their own mutuality rules generally consider the preclusive effect of
foreign judgments a subject particulary appropriate for individual choice by each state.
Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1601.
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desires to predict the extent to which a court should recognize the judg-
ments of sister jurisdictions.
The United States Constitution commands recognition of sister state
judgments by requiring that courts afford "Full Faith and Credit" to the
records and judicial proceedings of every other state.32 Pursuant to its
authority to prescribe the manner of proof for such records and proceed-
ings,3 Congress enacted the Act of May 26, 1790, which provides that the
records and proceedings of any state shall have the same full faith and
credit within every court as they have in the rendering state.34 Recorded
debates from the Constitutional Convention, however, provide little guid-
ance as to the intended purpose and meaning of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution.5 Evidently, the framers of the clause and im
plementing statute intended to alter the status of the states as indepen-
dent sovereigns and to restrain the freedom of a state to ignore the judicial
proceedings of a sister state. 8 By requiring all states to respect judicial
proceedings regardless of the state of origin, the framers hoped to make the
states integral parts of a unified national system.37
Although a literal reading of the implementing statute supports the
Restatement's position requiring deference to the collateral estoppel prin-
ciples of the rendering state, critics of the Restatement position contend
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the effect thereof.
3 Id.
"' The Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, implemented the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution. The Act is codified currently at 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970), and
provides:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenti-
cated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
This statutory provision has remained virtually unchanged since 1790. See Johnson v. Muel-
berger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273
(1935).
3 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951). See generally Costigan, The History
of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Considera-
tion of the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. Ray.
470, 472 (1904) [hereinafter cited as Costigan].
-" Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, individual states were free to exercise their
independant status by ignoring the judicial proceedings and declarations of sister states. See
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
31 See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. Rav. 371,
388 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Corwin]. In addition to promoting national unity, the history
of the adoption of the full faith and credit clause implies that the framers included the full
faith and credit provision in the Constitution to favor state and territorial judgments over
judgments rendered by foreign nations. Costigan, supra note 35, at 484-85.
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that the statute should receive a flexible interpretation." These critics
assert that the statute is vastly oversimplified and was drafted only to
insure that simple money judgments could be enforced in any state." Crit-
ics contend that an examination of the fundamental principles underlying
the Constitution discloses that the framers desired to promote the princi-
pal advantages of a centralized government while preserving the indepen-
dent status and dignity of each state." Thus, to preserve the individuality
of the states, critics assert that national policy interests should submit to
the interests of the individual states except where such submision severely
threatens the preservation of a centralized government." In addition, crit-
s Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith and Credit:
The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Rodgers & Rodgers]; see text accompanying note 46 infra.
1 Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup.
CT. REv. 89, 90 [hereinafter cited as Currie, Judgments].
The earliest cases to arise under the full faith and credit clause were actions brought on
money judgments rendered in a sister state. Corwin, supra note 37, at 376. The first Supreme
Court case interpreting the full faith and credit clause was Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
481 (1813). Francis Scott Key argued for the appellant that a foreign judgment of nil debet
(action of debt on a simple contract) was admissible only as evidence in the sister state. The
Court, however, held that the foreign judgment was final and conclusive on the parties. Id.
at 484; see Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818); Jackson, Full Faith
and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7 (1945). See
generally Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdiction Issues,
36 GEo. L.J. 154, 154 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Rashid]; Note, Full Fatih and Credit to
Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CAL. L. REv. 282, 283 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Law and Reason.].
Courts have condoned many exceptions to a literal interpretation of the statute. See, e.g.,
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963)(state decree that land is located in one state is not
conclusive in determination of same issue in the competing state); Milwaukee County v. M.
E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (enforcement of foreign tax claim); Alaska Packer's As'n
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)(refusing to require full faith and credit
to all sister state statutory law). Exceptions to the letter of the full faith and credit clause
are permitted when the result of strict adherence is not within the spirit of the clause.
Exceptions generally include such matters that the Constitution plainly leaves to the sole
power of an individual state. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
In addition, courts recognize an exception to strict adherence to full faith and credit when
such adherence jeopardizes a superior state interest. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106
(1963); Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). Formulation of exceptions
to the full faith and credit clause, however, requires extreme caution to insure that the
exceptions neither conflict with the needs of federal unity nor provide a basis for the eventual
destruction of the clause itself. Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 COLUm. L. Rev. 153, 178-79 (1949)[hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson]. See
generally Carrington, supra note 31, at 382; Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 38, at 1592 n.14;
Law and Reason, supra, at 1595; Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 540.
0 See Reese & Johnson, supra note 39, at 163.
" See id. at 164. See generally Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.,
225 U.S. 111, 133 (1912)(full faith and credit clause has effect of putting foreign judgment
upon the plane of domestic judgment with respect to conclusiveness as to facts adjudged).
The "unmistakable language" test compliments the argument for preserving state indi-
viduality because adherence to the "unmistakable language" test would mean that no judg-
ment would receive full faith and credit outside the jurisdiction of rendition absent an explicit
declaration by the rendering court that the judgment shall be conclusive beyond the rendering
19781
1000 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ics of the Restatement rule contend that the rule departs from the normal
tendency in conflicts decisions to apply the law of the forum state, includ-
ing conflicts law."2 Because of differing concepts of the full and fair oppor-
tunity test that result from the discretion exercised by trial judges,'3 the
critics contend that subsequent courts should not be saddled with the
difficult task of "thinking with the minds of others" in determining what
courts of the rendering state would do."
Although critics of the Restatement rule are at times persuasive, the
greater weight of reasoned authority supports the Restatement principle
of deference to the rendering state's mutuality requirement. 5 The full faith
and credit clause is simple and precise in its demand that a state court
determination of an issue be given the same effect in the courts of another
state as that determination would receive in the state of rendition. Nothing
short of the same effect would be full faith and credit." The traditional
practice of courts to consider the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment
as part of the judgment for purposes of full faith and credit analysis pro-
vides additional support for the Restatement position. 7 Furthermore, if
jurisdiction's borders. See Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). See generally
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943)(Stone, J., dissenting). The
"unmistakable fanguage" test should be rejected, however, because full faith and credit is a
national rather than a state policy. See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra. Because its
purpose is to create a unified nation by altering the status of otherwise independent states,
federal law, not state law, should proscribe the effect given to sister state judgments. See
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948); Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 552 (1947); text
accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
,1 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941); Currie, Conflict
of Laws, supra note 2, at 178; Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori -Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,
58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960); Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5
U. ToRoNTo L.J. 133 (1943). One function of the law of the forum, the lex fori, is to determine
when and how the forum will adopt foreign law. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). For
example, if a court trying a contract case determines that the law of the place of contracting
will control, the lex fori will determine what constitutes the place of contracting. See Bowen
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 705 (E.D.Mo. 1940), affl'd, 117 F.2d 298 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941). When a suit requires application of the law of a party's
domicile, the lex fori determines the fact of domicile. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 306 F.
Supp. 1177 (N.D.Ala. 1969). In addition, the lex fori determines whether a matter is substan-
tive or procedural. See Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915); Patch v. Stanley Works,
448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971).
43 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
" Carrington, supra note 31, at 385; Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 540-41.
See, e.g., Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1941); EHnNZWEIG, supra note
2, at §66; GOODuCH & ScoLus, supra note 2, at §217.
"1 See Tindle v. Celebrezze, 210 F. Supp. 912, 915 (S. D.Cal. 1962); note 32 supra. See
generally Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961); Riley v. New York
Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1942); Costigan, supra note 35, at 478; Rashid, supra note
39, at 155. The second court to consider the issue has no discretion; the entire body of law as
developed in the rendering state concerning the preclusive effect of judgments is applicable.
Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. Rav. 33, 38
(1963)[hereinafter cited as Vestal, Res Judicatal.
4 Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1592 n.14.
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individual states can ignore the judicial determination of issues made by
sister states, the goal of a unified national system underlying the full faith
and credit clause will be frustrated."
The implementing statute of the full faith and credit clause lends addi-
tional credence to the Restatement position. The statute amplifies the
constitutional mandate by requiring that the full faith and credit afforded
the judicial proceedings of another state must be the "same" as such
proceedings would receive in the state of rendition. 9 Thus, rather than
merely mimic the constitutional language, the legislature sought to quan-
tify explicitly the extent of the full faith and credit requirement 0 Finally,
although Restatement critics emphasize the dangers of forcing courts to
apply the laws of other states, courts frequently must interpret foreign laws
in other contexts."
In further support of the Restatement rule of deference to the rendering
state's mutuality requirement, the rule operates simply and fairly by mak-
ing the effects of a judgment foreseeable. When a court renders a decision
" See text accompanying note 37 supra. Because conflicts are infrequent, the interest of
each state in controlling its internal affairs will not be hindered severely by honoring a sister
state's mutuality requirements. Therefore, the state interest hardly suffices to thwart the
national interest in preserving a unified judicial network in which the integrity of state court
proceedings remains intact. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 441 (1943).
In the rare cases in which the interests of the state are actually superior to the national
policy of uniformity, the Restatement allows deference to the state's interest. REsTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CorFuar oF LAWS §103 (1971), provides:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the
national policy of Full Faith and Credit because it would involve an improper
interference with important interests of the sister state.
Although the precise extent of acceptable exceptions is not clear, this section of the Restate-
ment has an extremely narrow scope of application. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONMICr OF
LAWS §103, Comment a (1971). Under one such exception, State A need not recognize a
sister state injunction against suit in State A's court& on the ground that State A is an incon-
venient forum. See Cunningham v. Cunningham, 25 Conn. Sup. 221, 200 A.2d 734 (1964). In
addition, a state may religitate issues in a sister state custody case on the ground that a court
should be free to inquire into the best interests of a child. See Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d
575, 136 N.E.2d 866 (1956). Full faith and credit, however, requires recognition of previously
decided issues even though the public policy of the rendering state is contrary to the policy
of the forum state. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (state interest
in determining marital status of domiciliary); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202
(1933) (state interest in requiring parent to support child domiciled within the state); Fauntle-
roy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (state interest in preventing gambling in the state).
"1 The implementing statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970), provides that judicial proceedings
"shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States. . . as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such state from which they were taken ... " (emphasis
supplied). See note 34 supra.
'o See generally Costigan, supra note 35, at 478; Rashid, supra note 39, at 155.
Courts frequently must interpret foreign laws in actions based on torts committed in
another state. Matters of substance pertaining to a right of action in tort may be governed
by the law of the place of the wrong, the lex loci delicti. See Wallan v. Rankin 173 F.2d 488
(9th Cir. 1949); Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc.2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup.Ct.
1969). A court that tries an action based on a tort committed in another state thus may be
called upon to interpret the law of that jurisdiction.
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on a specific issue, the affected parties can have a clear understanding of
the judgment's ramifications only if subsequent courts that consider the
litigated issues defer to the rendering forum's mutuality requirement.2 If
subsequent courts ignore the Restatement position and a litigated issue
arises in subsequent foreign litigation, the preclusive effect of the initial
judgment on that issue could vary with each jurisdiction. Under the Re-
statement rule, the parties in the initial suit would be aware of the preclu-
sive effect of the litigated issues because the mutuality requirement of the
state in which the initial court sits will control all subsequent litigation.
Thus, the foreseeability of the consequences will allow an intelligent deter-
mination of trial strategy.53 In addition, when litigants can anticipate the
consequences of litigation, forum shopping and collusion in multi-state
litigation will be reduced. 4
When the judgment state requires mutuality and the subsequent forum
state does not, the issue becomes the desirability of allowing a sister state
to give greater full faith and credit to the judgment than that judgment
would receive in the rendering state. Under the Restatement rule, the
litigated issues would receive only the respect demanded by the rendering
state.55 Critics of the Restatement rule contend that nothing in the full
faith and credit clause should operate to prevent the forum state from
giving broader effect to a foreign judgment than that judgment would have
5' See Carrington, supra note 31, at 385; Multistate Litigation, supra note 18, at 1599.
See Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 901 (4th Cir. 1965). The import-
ance of foreseeability to trial strategy is obvious in mass tort situations where a defendant
faces many tort suits arising out of a single accident. If subsequent courts follow the Restate-
ment rule, the defendant enters each suit with a full understanding of whether non-parties
to the action may use litigated issues to their advantage in subsequent suits. With this
knowledge, the defendant can determine appropriate expenditures of resources depending on
the extent to which he will be bound by the litigated issues in later suits. If subsequent courts
do not follow the Restatement rule, a defendant must put forward his best defense in each
suit because he can never be sure of the ramifications of the litigated issues.
In these mass tort situations, the argument for requiring the rendering court to demand
strict mutuality is convincing. For example, if a defendant faces thirty tort suits arising out
of a single accident, the first twenty injured plaintiffs may lose their individual suits against
the defendant. If mutuality is not required and the twenty-first plaintiff wins a judgment,
the remaining nine plaintiffs may be able to claim a collateral estoppel effect from the twenty-
first judgment. In such a situation, the defendant has everything to lose and little to gain in
each suit. Currie, Mutuality, supra note 19, at 285-89; see In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F.
Supp. 757, 765 (S.D.Ohio 1972), rev'd sub noam., Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); Mulitstate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1597 n.48;
57 H1Rv. L. REv. 98, 105 (1943). If the rendering court required mutuality, the defendant
would enter each suit with knowledge of his potential losses. With such knowledge the defen-
dant may litigate more strenously those cases where several plaintiffs join together and
potential losses are greater than in a suit brought by a single plaintiff.
" Carrington, supra note 31, at 385; see Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894,
901 (4th Cir. 1965). But see Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 541. Absent the Restatement
rule, persons who were not parties to the initial suit may attempt to bring subsequent actions
in jurisdictions that do not require mutuality and thus enjoy the benefits of collateral estop-
pel. See Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 901 (4th Cir. 1965).
-1 The Restatement rule determines what persons and issues are bound by a valid judg-
ment according to the law of the rendering state. See note 28 supra.
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in the rendering forum.58 The critics aver that the Constitution requires
subsequent jurisdictions to accept the rendering state's concept of preclu-
sion as a minimum standard.57 Where that view is adopted, the precluded
party receives a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the original
case." Furthermore, Restatement critics contend that the foreign judg-
ment thereby has broad effect in a manner which is not degrading to the
rendering forum. 9 Nevertheless, permitting an out-of-state court to give
greater effect to a judgment than that judgment would receive in the
rendering state violates the latter state's integrity." The implementing
statute requires that foreign judgments receive the same full faith and
credit,6" no less and no more. 2 In addition, fairness demands that a party
contemplating litigation be able to foresee the consequences of a judg-
merit.83 A party can predict the consequences of a judgment only by realiz-
" See Carrington, supra note 31, at 383; Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1593;
Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 540; see, e.g., Hart v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Misc.2d
41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup.Ct. 1969).
17 See Vestal, Res Judicata, supra note 46, at 41.
u See id.; text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra. When the forum court's mutuality
requirement is less restrictive than that of the rendering state, critics contend that the
requirements of due process should be the only limit on the preclusive effect that the forum
accords litigated issues. See id. See generally Vestal, Res Judicata, supra note 46, at 47-53.
0 See Bigelowv. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,133 (1912);
Carrington, surpa note 31, at 383. In effect, critics argue that giving broader effect to a
judgment than that judgment would receive in the rendering forum should be construed as a
demonstration of confidence in the competency of the rendering forum. For support of the
proposition that a subsequent court may give greater effect to a judgment than the judgment
would receive in the rendering jurisdiction, Restatement critics rely on Bigelow, supra, where
the court stated that "[t]he effect of the implementing statute is to put the judgment of a
court of one State, when sued upon, or pleaded in estoppel, in the courts of another State,
upon the plane of a domestic judgment in respect of conclusiveness as to the facts adjudged."
225 U.S. at 133. These critics, however, neglect the Bigelow Court's view that the "general
effect of a judgment of a court of one State when relied upon as an estoppel in the courts of
another State is that which it has, by law or usage, in the courts of the State from which it
comes." Id. at 135.
0 Situations in which a sister state attempts to give effect to issues adjudicated but not
yet finalized or validated according to the more stringent requirements of the forum demon-
strate the potential for violation of the rendering state integrity because a yet invalid judg-
ment remains subject to alteration or withdrawl. See Carrington, supra note 31, at 383-84.
In addition, giving effect to invalid sister state judgments comes dangerously close to violat-
ing due process when the rendering state lacks jurisdiction. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610,
614 (1947); GOODnICH & ScoLEs, supra note 2, at §209; Scott, supra note 7, at 18-22. In Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 133 (1912), the Court recog-
nized that according collateral estoppel effect to issues litigated by a court lacking jurisdiction
denies the precluded party his day in court. The Court thus concluded that "the full faith
and credit to be accorded does not preclude an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court which
pronounced the judgment, or its right to bind the persons against whom the judgment is
sought to be enforced." Id. at 135.
, 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970); see note 34 supra.
See Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614 (1947); Board of Public Works v. Columbia
College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521, 529 (1873). But see Collateral Estoppel, supra note 8, at 539-
40.
3 See Carrington, supra note 31, at 385.
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ing the extent of applicable mutuality requirements before trial. 4
The Restatement rule also applies to federal courts, although addi-
tional considerations are involved when a federal court considers a pre-
viously litigated issue. If both federal and state systems employ the same
rules regarding mutuality of estoppel, the application of collateral estoppel
produces no significant differences. 5 Federal courts, however, have demon-
strated a greater willingness to abolish the requirement of mutuality than
have state courts." Rather than retaining the mechanical requirements of
mutuality, federal courts consider whether the party against whom collat-
eral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity for judicial resolu-
tion of the issue. 7 Federal courts justify the demise of mutuality by noting
64 See id. See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d Cir. 1964); Currie,
Mutuality, supra note 19, at 285-89; note 53 supra.
13 See Comment, Res Judicata in the Federal Courts: Application of Federal or State
Law: Possible Differences Between the Two, 51 CoRNELL L.Q. 96, 106 (1965)[hereinafter cited
as Res Judicata in the Federal Courts]. Where neither the rendering state court nor the
federal court considering the issue in subsequent litigation require mutuality, the result is
the same whether the federal court defers to the rendering state requirement or employs its
own. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 541 (2d Cir.
1965)(where state and federal courts follow the same rule, no difference in result).
68 See Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 668-70 (6th Cir. 1973); Collateral Estoppel,
supra note 8, at 541. But see Res Judicata in the Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 106-07.
Although the first significant judicial rejection of the mutuality requirement came from a
state court in Bernhard v. Bank of America Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942), the federal courts soon followed suit. In Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870
(6th Cir. 1959), a federal circuit court precluded a plaintiff from relitigating an issue against
one defendant after losing on that issue against another defendant in a prior suit. In Blonder-
Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the Supreme Court rejected
the requirement of mutuality after engaging in an extensive analysis of the economic ramifi-
cations of relitigating patent infringement cases. The court in United States v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (D.Nev. 1962), succinctly summed up the prevailing federal
position as follows:
While it is true that the general rule requires that there be identity of parties to
invoke the doctrine of res judicata, nevertheless, the Courts, increasingly so in the
last 20 years, have not adhered to that doctrine, and have held no constitutional
right is violated where the thing to be litigated was actually litigated in a previous
suit, final judgment entered, and the party against whom the doctrine is to be
invoked had a full opportunity to litigate the matter and did actually litigate it.
216 F. Supp. at 725-26, quoted in Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 670 (6th Cir. 1973)(em-
phasis in original).
67 Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231 n.3 (1st Cir. 1972); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1964). When a subsequent court determines whether the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted received a full and fair opportunity for judicial
resolution in the prior suit, the subsequent court should consider the choice of forum and the
party's incentive to litigate in the previous action. See note 53 supra. In addition, the subse-
quent court should consider whether the prior court understood the complexities of the case
or deprived a party of presenting crucial evidence, and whether the prior judgment was the
probable result of a compromise verdict. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964).
Proper rulings on estoppel pleas rest on the trial court's sense of justice and equity. Blonder-
Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971). See generally
James Talcott, Inc., v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1971);
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the resultant orderliness and time savings in judicial administration. 8 The
federal courts recognize, however, that overriding considerations of fairness
to a litigant occasionally may warrant a different result."9 In addition, the
federal judiciary long has held that under appropriate circumstances, a
court may employ collateral estoppel to bind a non-party to the original
suit when that individual's interests were protected adequately under the
theory of "virtual representation" in the original suit.7
Because the same conflicts between mutuality rules exist between state
and federal courts as exist between courts of different states, a federal
court considering issues that were litigated previously in a state court must
decide whether to use the federal mutuality requirement or the require-
ment of the rendering state. Federal courts accept the Restatement view
that- courts considering previously litigated issues should defer to the mu-
tuality requirement of the rendering state.71 Whenever possible, federal
courts have looked to the mutuality requirement of the rendering court.72
Furthermore, federal courts hearing diversity cases have demonstrated this
preference by adopting the Restatement rule when state law fails to indi-
cate whether state courts must adopt the rendering state's mutuality re-
quirement. 73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTs §68 (1942); Scott, supra note 7, at 4-5.
a See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950). State courts as well
as federal courts assert the resulting judicial economy to justify rejection of mutuality. See
Bernhard v. Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); B. R.
DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
,1 See Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950). When a defendant
faces lawsuits instituted by many plaintiffs, overriding considerations of fairness may warrant
a court to require mutuality. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346
F.2d 532, 541 (2d Cir. 1965); 57 HARv. L. Rxv. 98, 105 (1943); note 53 supra.
70 "Virtual representation" is an exception to the general rule that only those individuals
who stand in privity with a party are bound by a judgment. Under the rule of virtual represen-
tation, a person who is not a party may be bound by a judgment if his interests align so closely
with the interests of a party that the non-party's interests were asserted adequately at the
trial. Chicago Rock Is. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1926); Southwest Airlines
Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977). Virtual representation is a
question of fact to be decided by the trial court. Astron Indus. Assoc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1968).
11 See note 28 supra.
See Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942); United States v. Silliman,
167 F.2d 607, 620 (3d Cir. 1948).
See Breeland v. Security Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1969); Behrens v. Skelly,
173 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949). After Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of
the state in which the court sits if the law is substantive or outcome determinative. Hence,
most federal courts have applied the mutuality requirement of the state in which the court
sits on the assumption that the mutuality requirement is outcome determinative. See Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Pallen v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 223 F.
Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); text accompanying notes 77-81 infra. Although federal court
adoption of the Restatement rule in the absence of applicable state decisions implies a federal
court preference for the Restatement rule, federal application of state law may be unwar-
ranted because of the inapplicability of the Erie analysis to res judicata rulings. See text
accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
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Although the Restatement does not specifically address all possible
situations involving federal courts, 74 the Restatement policy of deferring to
the mutuality requirement of the rendering jurisdiction applies in all fed-
eral court situations. When determining the collateral estoppel effect of
state-litigated issues, the federal courts should defer to the law of the
rendering state regardless of whether the federal court sits in the same
state as the rendering court75 and irrespective of the grounds of federal
jurisdiction. 7 Nevertheless, most federal courts exercising diversity juris-
diction engage in an Erie analysis 77 to determine their choice of mutuality
requirement. 78 These courts consider the application of collateral estoppel
to be "outcome determinative" under the Rules of Decision Act7" as con-
strued in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." Because the application of collateral
estoppel is outcome determinative, these federal courts apply the collateral
estoppel rules of the state in which they sit, including that state's mutual-
ity requirement."' The Rules of Decision Act, however, requires that state
law supply the rule of decision in federal courts "except where . . .Acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide." 2 Since Congress explicitly pro-
vided otherwise in the implementing statute of the full faith and credit
clause, " an Erie analysis is misplaced in considerations of collateral estop-
pel. " As in the case of a subsequent state court action, the Constitution
7' The Restatement specifically addresses only situations in which a state court rendered
the initial judgment. See note 28 supra.
15 See Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 750-55 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Degnan]; Res Judicata in the Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 96-99; see, e.g.,
Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d
Cir. 1978).
11 See Degnan, supra note 75, at 750-55; Res Judicata in the Federal Courts, supra note
65, at 96-99; see, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Bowen v. United States, 570
F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978).
' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); note 73 supra.
7S See, e.g., Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1975); Ritchie v. Landau,
475 F.2d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 1973). For an extensive listing of federal cases relying on the Erie
approach, see Degnan, supra note 75, at 753 n.49.
11 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1970).
A See, e.g., Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1181
(3d Cir. 1972); Pallen v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Noting
that "the application of either the state or federal doctrine to a given case could be 'outcome-
determinative'," the Lynne Carol court concluded that "Guaranty Trust Co. would seem to
require application of the state rule." 453 F.2d at 1181; see text accompanying note 73 supra.
8" See, e.g., Pallen v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The
Pallen court reasoned that the determination of which law would govern mutuality turned
on whether the law would be outcome determinative and whether a strong federal interest
would warrant application of federal law. Id. at 395. Concluding that the law of collateral
estoppel was outcome determinative and that there was no overriding federal interest, the
Pallen court turned to state law. Id. See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEx. L. REv. 657, 666 (1959)[hereinafter cited as Traynor].
28 U.S.C. §1652 (1970).
"3 See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
"4 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970). See generally Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The
Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678 (1976).
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and implementing statute require that courts afford foreign judicial re-
cords and proceedings the same full faith and credit as they have in the
state of rendition." Although the Constitution does not state expressly that
federal courts must follow the full faith and credit mandat, 8 these courts
uniformly follow the constitutional requirement.u Furthermore, the imple-
menting statute addresses itself to "every court within the United
States".'s The implementing statute, drafted contemporaneously with the
adoption of the Constitution, enlarged the application of the full faith and
credit clause by replacing the reference to "States" with "every court
within the United States". 9 Thus, Congress may have intended to bring
the federal courts within the statute's focus."
The Restatement rule of deference to the mutuality requirement of the
rendering state clearly does not address situations involving subsequent
litigation of issues which were decided previously in a federal court. Never-
Reference to the conflicts law of the forum state is harmless when a state court of the
forum rendered the prior judgment. See, e.g., Priest v. American Smelting & Refining Co.,
409 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1969); Graves v. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 896 (4th
Cir. 1965); Behrens v. Skelly, 173 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir. 1949). When the federal court
considers a judgment of a state other than the forum, however, the Erie analysis permits
deference to the rendering state's mutuality requirement only if the forum state would so
defer. See Degnan, supra note 75, at 750-55. Thus, even when these federal courts correctly
turn to the mutuality rule of the rendering state, they do so not by the direct authority of
the full faith and credit clause, but indirectly, by way of the forum state's conflicts law. See
id. Moreover, when the conflicts law of the forum state does not compel deference to the
mutuality requirement of the rendering state, the result does not comport with the constitu-
tional mandate of full faith and credit. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
Many federal courts sitting in diversity apply the res judicata rules of the forum state
on the ground that they are sitting merely as another court of the state. See, e.g., St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 476 F.2d 583, 585 (4th Cir. 1973); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d
151, 154 (2d Cir. 1973); Priest v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 409 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th
Cir. 1969); Blum v. William Goldman Theatres, 174 F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1949). These courts
base their decisions either on a misapplication of Erie or on the authority of Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), which required a federal court sitting in diversity
to apply the conflicts law of the forum state. Id. at 496-97. While the Kaxon Court addressed
a conflicts issue in light of Erie, the issue was a conflict over which state's substantive law
regarding manditory interest should apply rather than a situation calling for full faith and
credit for a state judgment. See id. Of course, when diversity does not exist, courts generally
do not consider the forum state law. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
- 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970); see Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978);
Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553
F.2d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 1977); text accompanying notes 32-34 & 46-50 supra.
U See U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; Degnan, supra note 75, at 741; Res Judicata in the Federal
Courts, supra note 65, at 97.
91 See Res Judicata in the Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 97; see, e.g., Huron Holding
Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Oper. Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941) (federal court must afford full faith and
credit to state attachment proceedings); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813)(full
faith and credit clause requires state court decision to have same faith and credit in "every"
other court).
28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970); see Degnan, supra note 75, at 743.
" See Degnan, supra note 75, at 743.
10 See id.
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theless, deference to the rendering jurisdiction's mutuality requirement is
sound policy even when a federal court renders a judgment and a state
court subsequently considers the litigated issues." Although neither the
full faith and credit clause nor the implementing statute specifically re-
quires deference to federal courts, the Supreme Court has stated repeat-
edly that the rule applies to federal court judgments.2 Moreover, the im-
portance of preserving the integrity of federal court judgments requires
deference to the federal court mutuality requirement. 3 Out of respect for
the federal courts94 and to further the policy of deterring endless relitiga-
9' See id. at 755; Res Judicata in the Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 107-10.
92 See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 170 (1938); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-11
(1882); Vestal, Res Judicata, supra note 46, at 35-36. The requirement that state courts apply
full faith and credit to federally litigated issues follows from the expansion of full faith and
credit beyond the explicit constitutional language. The implementing statute expands the
constitutional mandate by requiring federal courts to recognize state judgments and by ex-
tending application of full faith and credit to the courts of United States possessions and
territories. See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Oper. Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941); Hazen
Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974); text accompany-
ing notes 86-90 supra. Thus, courts have read into the implementing statute "a requirement
that state courts extend full respect to the judgments of federal judicial tribunals within the
states, in the absence of any such statutory command." Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega
Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974).
13 Failure to require deference to the federal court mutuality requirement would allow
subsequent state trial courts the power to disregard the conclusive effect of federally litigated
issues if the state mutuality requirement so permits. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511
F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975). Hart v. American Airlines, Inc.,
61 Misc.2d 41, 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup.Ct. 1969) provides an example of state court disregard
of federally litigated issues. In Hart, a New York court employed its own mutuality rules to
determine the effect of a judgment rendered by a federal district court in Texas. See generally
Multistate Litigation, supra note 19. The Hart court reasoned that it had a duty to protect
New York residents from "anacronistic" treatment of other jurisdictions. 61 Misc.2d at 44,
304 N.Y.S.2d at 813. Furthermore, the court reasoned that Texas had no legitimate interest
in imposing its rules of collateral estoppel on New York residents. Id. The New York court
considered the defendant's reliance on full faith and credit misplaced because the constitu-
tional clause applied only to enforcement of judgments. Id.
The Hart court, however, failed to recognize several important considerations. First,
although the initial judgment came from the state of Texas, a federal court rendered it. See
American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969). Arguably, preservation
of the integrity of a federal court judgment outweighs the questionable interest of a state in
playing favorites with its residents. See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc.,
546 F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1977). Moreover, many courts consider res judicata effect to be part
of a judgment, and the Supreme Court's application of full faith and credit to federal judg-
ments clearly controls the issue. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938); Embrey v. Palmer,
107 U.S. 3 (1882); Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1592 n.14; cf. Vestal, Res Judicata,
supra note 46, at 35-36 (res judicata principles rather than full faith and credit require
subsequent state court to honor all res judicata rules of the rendering federal court). But see
note 48 supra.
"1 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1975) (preserving the integ-
rity of federal court judgments is important federal goal); Degnan, supra note 75, at 769.
Whenever the interests of the United States and a state conflict, the state interest is always
subordinate to the paramount United States interest. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12
(1927); Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818); U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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tion," state courts must defer to the mutuality requirement of the render-
ing federal court. If state courts could alter the effect of federal court
judgments by imposing their own mutuality requirements, federal courts
would be an unreliable forum for final adjudication of issues."
At present, federal courts have not settled the question of which mu-
tuality requirement applies when a federal court litigant asserts a pre-
viously litigated issue from another federal court. When both federal courts
acquire jurisdiction by reason of a federal question,97 the mutuality re-
quirement of the rendering federal court applies." Rather than rationaliz-
ing this practice by full faith and credit law or principles of res judicata,
the operation of the federal mutuality requirement enjoys legitimacy be-
cause both courts are arms of the same sovereignty." When federal courts
consider federal issues, no state can claim an interest sufficient to warrant
frustration of national uniformity among federal courts.' The importance
of uniform administration of federal courts,101 however, justifies the appli-
cation of the federal mutuality requirement regardless of how the federal
,1 Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 90 (5th Cir. 1977);
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Blonder-
Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
" Providing a reliable forum for final adjudication of claims benefits the diversity liti-
gant who seeks to avoid any bias that might result from his out-of-state status. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). If a state court ignores a federal
diversity judgment, such disregard would defeat the purpose of the diversity jurisdiction to
have issues decided without regard to a litigant's domiciliary status. Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975).
28 U.S.C. §1331 (1970).
' See, e.g., Artrip v. Califano, 569 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Williamson v. Columbia
Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950); Mathews v. New York Racing Ass'n, 193 F.
Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715
(5th Cir. 1975). In effect, federal courts considering a federal question will apply their own
rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which do not include a mutuality requirement.
See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (federal courts will apply their own rules of
res judicata); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1975) (federal law
governs question whether prior federal court judgment based on federal question jurisdiction
is res judicata in second federal court); text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
" See Vestal, Res Judicata, supra note 46, at 36-37. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941), the defendant attempted to raise the same
issue that he had raised unsuccessfully in previous federal litigation. The court reasoned that
... the matter here is one between two courts of the same sovereignty, the United
States of America. If one federal court failed to give effect to the judgment of
another federal court the Supreme Court of the United States, as head of the
judicial system of the United States would compel it to do so because "they are
many members yet but one body".
Id. at 86.
11 See text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra. See also Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew,
511 F.2d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1975); La Societe Anonyme des Parfums Le Galion v. Jean Patou,
Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757, 760-61
(S.D.Ohio 1972); cf. Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962) (determining the scope
of its own judgments is one of a court's strongest policies).
,"2 See text accompanying notes 37 & 99 supra.
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courts acquire jurisdiction."2 Two grounds exist for complying with the
federal mutuality requirement when the rendering court sits in diversity.
First, the full faith and credit clause demands that subsequent courts
recognize prior judgments."3 Moreover, because collateral estoppel rules
comprise part of the judgment,' the applicable mutuality requirement
fuses into the judgment." 5 Thus, the federal mutuality requirement neces-
sarily accompanies a federal judgment. Alternatively, the federal interests
in preserving the uniformity in administration and integrity of federal
courts overrides the need for federal diversity courts to reach the same
outcome as the courts of the forum state."' Under either the full faith and
credit clause or the superior federal interest analysis, a federal court should
apply federal collateral estoppel rules, including the mutuality require-
ment, to prior federal judgments whether the rendering court sat in diver-
sity or considered a federal question.
Whether federal or state courts are involved, the position taken by the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, that a court considering pre-
viously litigated issues should defer to the rendering court's mutuality
requiremdntl 7 exemplifies sound policy. If a state court renders the first
judgment, subsequent state and federal courts should apply the mutuality
requirement of the rendering state court.1rs When the rendering court is
federal, subsequent state and federal courts should heed the federal mu-
tuality requirement regardless of the grounds on which the rendering court
acquired jurisdiction.'0 Because assessing the legitimate interests of com-
peting sovereignties is essentially a political function, resolution of the
mutuality conflict deserves legislative attention." Nevertheless, until all
112 Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1977); In
re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757, 760-61 (S.D.Ohio 1972).
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970); text accompanying notes 46 & 84-
89 supra; see American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 689 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (application of full faith and credit governed by federal law). See also
text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
10, See Multistate Litigation, supra note 19, at 1592 n.14.
o See text accompanying note 47 supra. See also Eckerson v. Tanney, 235 F. 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd mem. 243 F. 1007 (2d Cir. 1917).
I" Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), provides strong support
for the proposition that the federal interest in preserving the uniformity in administration
and integrity of federal courts overrides the need for federal diversity courts to reach the same
outcome as the courts of the forum state. Id. at 537; see American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands,
462 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1972); Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2d Cir. 1962); ResJudicata
in the Federal Courts, supra note 65, at 100.02. See generally Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond:
A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL. L. Rxv. 443, 449 (1962).
Determining the preclusive effect of federally adjudicated issues on the basis of various state
mutuality requirements thwarts the important federal interest in uniformity in the federal
judiciary, see text accompanying notes 37 & 99 supra, and threatens federal court integrity
by subjecting federal judgments to state court control. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
10 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 45, 60, 75 & 76 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 91, 97 & 102 supra.
"o See Currie, Conflict of Laws, supra note 2, at 176; Currie, Judgments, supra note 39,
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jurisdictions abolish mutuality requirements,"' or until Congress takes
action, the federal courts should set an example that state courts may
emulate by giving previously litigated issues the same effect that those
issues would receive in the rendering jurisdiction."
2
ScoTT A. STOREY
at 90. To better represent all situations, Professor Degnan has suggested the following lan-
guage for possible legislative action:
A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United States
must be recognized by all other judicial systems within the United States, and the
claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound thereby, are
determined by the law of the system which rendered the judgment.
Degnan, supra note 75, at 773.
HI See text accompanying note 20 supra (trend toward abolition of mutuality). But see
text accompanying note 53 supra (desirability of mutuality in mass tort situations).
" See Traynor, supra note 81, at 667.

